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RECENT CASES.
Mutual Fire Insurance Companies -Power to Create Guaranty
Frund. - The recent case of Kennan v. Runde et al., 5 1 N. W. Rep.
426 (Wisconsin), contains a clear statement of the law of mutual
insurance companies. The plaintiff herein brings suit as receiver
of the effects of the Manufacturers Mutual Fire Insurance Com-
pany, now insolvent, upon a guaranty bond given by the defend-
ants as policy holders of the insolvent company. The company
was duly organized under the laws of Wisconsin as a mutual insur-
ance company, and continued in business till becoming embar-
rassed, suit was brought to close up its affairs and plaintiff was
appointed receiver. Sometime previous to the company's insol-
vency, its condition was unsatisfactory and discouraging. Many
policies were outstanding against it, the amount in the treasury
was small and the company -was existing under very straightened
circumstances; it was then that this bond upon which suit is now
brought, was given by all the policy holders of the company as a
guaranty fund for the payment of claims held then, or to be held
thereafter, by any persons under their contract of insurance. The
policy-holders by virtue of this bond promised to and with each
other, and with the company, for a valuable consideration to guar-
antee the payment of any existing and future indebtedness of the
company to the exact amount placed opposite their names, and
further promised to pay into the treasury of the company the
amount by them promised to be paid, upon a call legally made by
the directors of the company. The bond was accepted and ratified
by the said directors. This action is predicated upon the bond.
Upon a demurrer to the complaint and upon its being subsequently
overruled, the defendants appeal mainly upon the ground that
the bond was ultra vires and void. Orton, J., in the course of the
opinion, says, that "the question may be twofold: First, Was the
power to take such an instrument for such, a purpose expressly
conferred upon the company by the charter? Second, Was the
taking of such a guaranty obligation the necessary or proper
means of executing some power conferred ? It is not contended
that the guaranty which the plaintiff acquired was expressly
authorized by the charter. It certainly could not be contended
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that any such express power is conferred. If the power exist at
all it must be inferred from the general powers given. The
mutuality of liability to assessment and obligation to pay pro rata
for losses and expenses, are the essential distinguishing character-
istics of a mutual insurance company. This company had a very
large power to raise capital without resorting to such a guaranty
bond, viz. : ' the first premium may be paid in cash,' secondly, 'at
the time of effecting the insurance, the persons insured shall pay
a percentage in cash,' and thirdly, ' that such other charges may
be made as may be required by the by-laws of the corporation.' If
such a foreign resource, as the bond herein, is resorted to to relieve
the members partially, or some of them only, of such assessment,
to that extent the mutuality principle is destroyed and the nature
and legal character of the corporation subverted pro tanto, and the
company ceases to be such a corporation as the law requires,
wholly or partially. It is not simply the substitution of other
means that the law provides for the payment of losses and
expenses, but it destroys the essential nature and legal character
of the corporation as a mutual insurance company. This contract
is executory, and the Court is asked to enforce it. There are no
equities to palliate such a departure from the powers conferred by
the charter, and assumption of powers not only foreign, but which
if executed, would subvert the purpose and radically change the
nature of the corporation. We therefore hold that the contract is
ultra vires and void."
Constitutional Law-Post Offie-Lotteries. -Ex parte Rapier and
Exparte Dupre, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 374, decided February 1, 1892.
These were applications to the U. S. Supreme Court for discharge
by writ of habeas cor.us from arrest for alleged violations of the
recent act of Congress excluding lottery matter from the mails.
The court denies the writ prayed for, and through Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Fuller, reaffirms the principles laid down in Ex parte Jackson,
96 U. S. 727, to the effect that the power vested in Congress by the
Constitution embraces the regulation of the entire postal system of
the country, and that the right to determine what shall be carred
in the mails necessarily involves the right to determine what shall
be excluded. Congress therefore has the power to forbid the use
of the mails to carry matter used in the dissemination of crime or
immorality. The opinion proceeds: "The States, before the
Union was formed, could establish post offices and post roads, and
in doing so could bring into play the police power in the protection
of their citizens from the use of the means so provided for purposes
YALE LA W JO URNAL.
supposed to exert a demoralizing influence upon the people.
When the power to establish post offices and post roads was sur-
rendered to the Congress, it was a complete power; and the grant
carried with it the right to exercise all the powers which made
that power effective. It is not necessary that Congress should
have the power to deal with crime or immorality within the States
in order to maintain that it possesses the power to forbid the use
of the mails in aid of the perpetration of crime or immorality.
The argument that there is a distinction between mala prohibita
and mala in se, and that Congress might forbid the use of the
mails in promotion of such acts as are universally regarded as
mala in se, including all such crimes as murder, arson, burglary,
etc., and the offense of circulating obscene books and papers, but
cannot do so in respect to other matters which it might regard as
criminal or immoral, but which it has no power itself to prohibit,
involves a concession which is fatal to the contention of peti-
tioners, since it would be for Congress to determine what are
within and what are without the rule; but we think there is no
room for such a distinction here, and that it must be left to Con-
gress, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to determine in what
manner it will exercise the power it undoubtedly possesses. We
cannot regard the right to operate a lottery as a fundamental
right infringed by the legislation in question ; nor are we able to
see that Congress can be held, in its enactment, to have abridged
the freedom of the press. The circulation of newspapers is not
prohibited, but the government declines itself to become an agent
in the circulation of printed matter which it regards as injurious
to the people."
Sale -Insolvency of Purchaser- -Rights of Seller. -In Diem v.
Koblitz et al., 29 N. E. Rep. 1124 (Ohio), the question of stoppage
in transitu and a subsequent re-sale before the expiration of a term
of credit, receives an exhaustive treatment. It seems that a seller
is not bound to deliver goods to an insolvent buyer, even though
holding the vendee's note or bill for the price, payable at the
expiration of a term of credit, it being held that a party to a con-
tract of sale cannot sue for its breach, unless he is himself able to
perform on his part. After a citation of conflicting authorities
concerning the right of the vendee to maintain an action, though
himself unable to perform, and also in regard to the effect of
insolvency upon such inability, the Court said: " Insolvency is
incapacity. * * * When the sale is upon credit it is one of
the implied conditions of the contract that the vendee shall keep
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his credit good ; his promise to pay at a future day involving an
engagement on his part that he will remain, and then be, able to
pay, which engagement is broken when he becomes insolvent and
unable to pay, and the right of the vendor to stop performance of
the contract on his part. Nor is the rule varied by the fact that
the vendee has given a note or bill for the price, payable when
the credit expires." The insolvency of the vendee is sufficient to
justify the vendor for refusing to continue the delivery unless the
payment be made in cash. (Mining Co. v. Brown, 124 U. S. 385.)
Even admitting the right to refuse delivery, however, it was con-
tended that the vendor was obliged to keep the property ready for
delivery until the time of credit expired, and that a re-sale prior to
that time would be a breach of the contract. The court denies
this, saying: "The right of the vendee is to receive the goods at
the time the vendor contracts to deliver them. * * * The breach
therefore, if there be one, consists in his failure to deliver the
goods according to the contract, and occurs at that time and not
upon a sale subsequently made; the vendee's cause of action
arises, if at all, upon the failure to deliver and not on the re-sale.
* * * The right of re-sale grows out of the failure of the vendee
to keep his engagement. Not that the contract is thereby
rescinded, for that would defeat the vendor's remedy for damages
upon resale after due notice, but that he may elect to treat the
agreement for the credit as at an end, on account of the vendee's
default."
Princoal and Surety -Discharge of Surety.-Saint v. Wheeler
& Wilson Manufg. Co., io South. Rep. 539 (Ala). In this case a
bond was executed by Saint, as principal, and four others, as sure-
ties, for the faithful performance by Saint of the duties of a col-
lector. Certain funds collected were retained or embezzled by
him, and action was brought against him and his sureties to
recover the amount so embezzled. The evidence showed that
Saint was required to sell and discount notes and to take up and
re-sell sewing machines, exercising his discretion, in addition to his
work as a collector, which his sureties claimed increased the risk.
On this point the Court held that Saint's sureties were sureties
for his honesty, and that no modification of his duties could affect
their liability or save them from making good his defaults, unless
the imposition of such new duties or their performance rendered
impossible, or materially hindered or impeded, the proper per-
formance of the service originally undertaken. On the other
hand it appears that Walls, an agent of the company having gen-
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eral supervision over Saint, knowing of Saint's defalcation, did
not give notice to his sureties, but continued him in the service of
the company, entrusted more funds to his hands and extended
time of payment. After criticizing a number of cases to the effect
that the failure of one officer or agent of a corporation to give
notice of another agent's dishonesty to the sureties of such agent,
does not release such sureties, the Court said: "No doctrine of
the law is more familiar than that notice to an agent, within the
scope of his agency, is notice to the principal; and the doctrine
has in no connection been applied more frequently and uniformly
than to corporations and their agents. Indeed there is an abso-
lute necessity in all cases for its application to corporations, since
they act and can be dealt with only through agents. * *
If Walls, while acting for the corporation and in the capacity of
its agent with respect to the matters and things involved in
Saint's contract, received notice of such a conversion of its funds
as amounted to embezzlement or involved dishonesty, and without
imparting this knowledge to the sureties and receiving their assent
thereto, continued him in the service, the sureties are not liable
for Saint's subsequent defaults."
Recission of Deed- Fraud of Agent.- In Schultz et al. v. AfcLean
et al., 28 Pac. Rep. 105, (California), the plaintiffs were owners of
a tract of land on which there was a mortgage for about half its
value. The mortgagee had obtained a decree of foreclosure and
was about to sell the land in satisfaction of the same. To avoid
this the plaintiffs, upon the representations of one Robinson, an
attorney, that he could procure money on the land by loan, suffi-
cient to avert the sale, from a certain person (McLean) who would
deal only with him (Robinson), placed the title to the land in
Robinson's hands to use in effecting the proposed loan, directing
him to deliver the deed to McLean to hold subjecf to the terms of
an agreement for the loan which Robinson professed to have in his
possession. The facts were that McLean had never entered into
any such agreement, and understood that he took with the deed a
perfect title to the land as held by plaintiffs. This action was
brought upon defendants' taking possession and asserting title, to
rescind the deed on the ground of fraud. The court held, one
justice dissenting, that as both parties to the transaction were
innocent, and the fraud had been practiced by the agent of the
grantor, the relief prayed for would not be granted. The Court
says : "In this case plaintiffs and defendants were both innocent.
Neither knew that the fraud was being practiced, but if that fraud
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is productive of injury, the injury must result to the plaintiffs ;
for they placed it in the power of the wrong-doer to perpetrate
the fraud. The vendee will not be compelled by a court of equity
to lose the benefit of a bargain obtained in all fairness because of
a fraud practiced upon the vendors by their own agent. Under
such circumstances they must bear the consequences, for the loss
is chargeable to the trust reposed in said agent." This is but a
just extension of the well settled general rule that a grantor can-
not question his own conveyance upon the ground that a third,
party practiced a fraud upon him, not known to or participated in
by the grantee.
Boundaries on Streams -Accretion and Avulsion-Vissouri River
- Costs.- A very interesting discussion may be found in the
recent case of State of Nebraska v. State of Iowa, i2 Sup. Ct. Rep.
396, which was an original suit brought before the U. S. Supreme
Court to determine the boundary line between those two States.
The principal question at issue was whether the law of accretion
or the law of avulsion applied to the rapidly changing channel
of the Missouri river. The Court decided that the law of accre-
tion must govern. It was also held that the costs of the suit
should be divided between the two States, since the question was
of a governmental nature, in which each had a vital, though not a
litigious interest. Mr. Justice Brewer, in delivering the opinion,
cited many English, Latin, French and Spanish authorities which
will be of special interest to the historical student in tracing the
development of the law of accretion and avulsion.
Right of State to Take an Appeal in a Criminal Case.- U. S. v.
Tanges et al., U. S. Sup. Ct., April 4, 1892. By the Judiciary
Act of x891 the Supreme Court was given appellate jurisdiction
"in any case that involves the construction or application of the
Constitution of the United States," and in this case the Court holds
that that act did not give the Supreme Court jurisdiction in a
criminal case of an appeal or writ of error taken by the United
States from an original judgment in favor of the defendant. In
the opinion of Mr. Justice Gray is an interesting resumk of the dif-
ferent State authorities on this point, viz.: the right of the State
to sue out a writ of error in a criminal case. A few States,
Arkansas, Texas, California, and Michigan deny this right to the
State for the reason that it violates constitutional provisions, but
a larger number of States reaching the same conclusion base it on
the broader ground of the fundamental rule of the common law,
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Nemo debet bis vexari pro" una et eadem causa. In North Carolina,
Maryland, Louisiana and Pennsylvania the State is allowed, in
the absence of any statute giving it the right to bring error or
appeal after judgment for defendant, and in each case the question
seems to have become settled in the State by early practice before
it was contested. In general, however, the decisions "conclusively
show that under the common law as generally understood and.
administered in the United States, and in the absence of any stat-
ute expressly giving the right to the State, a writ of error cannot
be sued out in a criminal case after a final judgment in favor of
the defendant, whether that judgment has been rendered upon a
verdict of acquittal, or upon a 'determination by the court of an
issue of law. In either case, the defendant, having been once put
upon his trial and discharged by the court, is not to be again
vexed for the same cause, unless the legislature acting within its
constitutional authority, has made express provision for a review
of the judgment at the instance of the government."
Subscrztion by Corbporation -Ultra Vires.- Richelieu Hotel Co. v.
Encampment Co., 29 N. E. Rep. 1047 (Ill). The appellant corpo-
ration had subscribed $iooo to the encampment company for the
purpose of holding a military encampment at Chicago, and when
sued upon its subscription sought to avoid upon the ground that it
was ultra vires. The court held, however, that it was not beyond
the proper exercise of corporate powers. The holding at Chicago
of an International encampment would naturally bring many vis-
itors to the city who would require hotel accommodations and
largely increase the patronage of the hotels. Power to carry on a
hotel business carries with it as a necessary incident the power to
engage in any reasonable plan to increase the number of patrons,
and donations of money to enterprises calculated to bring to the
city large numbers of visitors, the Court said, fell within such
power. This case seems to be in direct conflict with the doctrine
laid down in Davis v. Old Colony Ri. R., 13i Mass. 258, and quoted
in i Morawetz on Corporations, 337, where it was held that a rail-
road had no right to guarantee the expenses of a musical festival
in anticipation of great profits to be earned by the increase of
traffic caused thereby.
Common Carriers- Limiting Common Law Liabiliy.- Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe R. R. Co. v. Dill, 29 Pacific Reporter 148.
Another Supreme Court, whose decisions are always received with
profound respect by the profession, has spoken, and with no
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uncertain sound on the question: Can a carrier limit its common
law liability by special contract with the shipper? Dill shipped
live-stock from Cedar Rapids, Iowa, to Estudge, Kansas, on
written contract with the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. R.
Co. for a through rate. At Atchison, where the C., R. I. and P.
R. R. connected with the A., T. and S. F. R. R., the agent of tbe
latter road refused to allow the stock to proceed on the old con-
tract and demanded as a condition precedent to the forwarding,
Dill's signature to a new contract which was given hurriedly and
without reading, and under pressure. Said contract was a limita-
tion of the carrier's common law liability. The Court says: "A
common carrier cannot limit his common law liability by a special
contract in writing with the shipper, unless it is freely and fairly
made, and the carrier cannot exact as a condition precedent for
carrying that the shipper must sign a contract in writing, limit-
ing or changing the common law liability. If the carrier has two
rates or charges for carrying stock or goods -one, if carried
under the old common law liability, and the other, if carried
under a special contract,- the shipper must have real freedom of
choice in making his selection."
Accident Insurance-Intoxication.-In Standard Life and Acc.
In=. Co. v. Jrones, io South. Rep. 530 (Ala.), the Court makes a
distinction between the popular and legal meanings of the phrase,
IIunder the influence of intoxicating drinks." In common par-
lance, and hence as it would impress a jury, the expression
"under the influence of intoxicating drinks," means a different
condition from that expressed by the word "intoxicated;" the
latter indicating a condition of temporary impairment of the
capacity to think and act correctly and efficiently, while the for-
mer may mean effects produced by intoxicants so slight as not to
impair any mental or physical faculty. But the phrase, "under
the influence of intoxicating drinks," as used in insurance policies,
and other documents of a similar character, has a legal signifi-
cance differing from the popular one, and implying such influence
as in reality amounts to intoxication.
Statute af Frauds- Original Undertaking.- Mackey v. Smith et
al., 28 Pac. Rep. 974 (Ore). Defendants were railroad contrac-
tors, and one Malone was a sub-contractor to whom plaintiff was
furnishing supplies. Plaintiff doubting Malone's ability to pay,
refused to continue furnishing supplies unless payment should be
guaranteed by defendants, whereupon defendants agreed by oral
YALE LAW JO URNAL.
promise to pay for whatever stock should thenceforth be furnished
to Malone. Upon an action by plaintiff for the price of stock so
furnished, it was held that defendant's promise was an original un-
dertaking, and not within the statute, and the fact that the goods
were charged on plaintiff's books to Malone, was not conclusive
that he was the party to whom credit was given. In the course
of the opinion the Court states the law concisely as follows: "If
credit was given entirely to defendants, and it was agreed that
they alone should be responsible, and in fact the sale was made to
them, though the goods were delivered to and for the use of
another person, the statute does not apply, and the defendants are
liable on their parol agreement." And further, in view of the
privity of interest arising from the contract relations of defend-
ants with said Malone, the Court remarks, that if the main pur-
pose of defendants in making the parol promise thus to become
liable for the debt of another, was to serve their own purpose or
interest, it is valid against them though not in writing.
-Telegraph Poles on a Public Highway - Compkensaton therefor to
Adjacent Owners.-Pacific Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Irvine et al., 49
Fed. Rep. i i 3 . The disputed question as to whether telegraph
poles and wires erected on a public highway, the fee of which
remains in the adjacent owners constitute an additional burden to
such owners, for which compensation may be obtained, has been
recently decided in the affirmative in the U. S. Circuit Court for
Southern California, on a motion for an injunction. The poles
and wires were erected by the complainants under a grant from
the board of supervisors but against the consent of the defendants.
Ross, J., says, "where the fee of the highway is vested in the pub-
lic, there can be no valid legal objection to a grant by the public
of a right to erect poles and wires, without regard to adjacent
property owners. But where the fee is in such owners, every use
of the road not in the line of public travel is an additional burden
for which the proprietor is entitled to an additional compensation,
and which cannot be constitutionally taken from him without his
consent, except by the proper legal proceedings."
